Security Risk Management

Security Adventure Management

Clifton Fifty. Smith , David J. Brooks , in Security Scientific discipline, 2013

Security risk management

"Security take a chance direction provides a means of better understanding the nature of security threats and their interaction at an private, organizational, or customs level" ( Standards Australia, 2006, p. 6). Generically, the take chances management procedure can exist applied in the security risk management context. Indeed, the take chances direction procedure advocated in ISO 31000 should be used as the foundation to gamble management in the greater organization; all the same, security hazard management has a number of unique processes that other forms of risk direction practice not consider.

The core of security hazard management still remains identical to what has been discussed, with the addition of informing assessments, such equally the threat assessment, criticality register, and vulnerability assessment. The relationship between chance management and these assessments provides what is considered security adventure management (Figure iii.four).

Effigy iii.iv. Security risk direction procedure.

 (Used with permission from SAI Global, Standards Australia, 2006, p. 14.)

In the procedure of establishing the context for security run a risk management, it must be stressed that for the success of the security program the process has to exist in-line with the key objectives of the organization, considering the strategic and organizational context. In improver, the outcomes have to been presented from a business perspective, rather than solely as security mitigation strategies.

Read full chapter

URL:

https://world wide web.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123944368000035

Adventure Management

David Watson , Andrew Jones , in Digital Forensics Processing and Procedures, 2013

5.5.i Overview

Information security run a risk management is the systematic application of direction policies, procedures, and practices to the task of establishing the context, identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring, and communicating data security risks.

Data Security Management tin be successfully implemented with an effective data security risk management process. There are a number of national and international standards that specify risk approaches, and the Forensic Laboratory is able to cull which it wishes to adopt, though ISO 27001 is the preferred standard and the Forensic Laboratory volition desire to be Certified to this standard. A list of some of these is given in Section 5.i.

An ISMS is a documented arrangement that describes the information avails to exist protected, the Forensic Laboratory's approach to risk management, the control objectives and controls, and the degree of assurance required. The ISMS tin be practical to a specific system, components of a organization, or the Forensic Laboratory as a whole.

Read full chapter

URL:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/scientific discipline/article/pii/B9781597497428000054

Risk Direction

Stephen D. Gantz , Daniel R. Philpott , in FISMA and the Run a risk Management Framework, 2013

Adventure Management

The Federal Information Security Management Act defines information security as "the protection of information and data systems from unauthorized access, utilise, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction" in order to safeguard their confidentiality, integrity, and availability [1]. No organisation can provide perfect information security that fully assures the protection of data and information systems, then in that location is ever some gamble of loss or harm due to the occurrence of adverse events. This take chances is adventure, typically characterized as a function of the severity or extent of the affect to an system due to an agin result and the likelihood of that event occurring [2]. Organizations identify, assess, and respond to risk using the discipline of run a risk management. Data security represents 1 way to reduce risk, and in the broader context of adventure direction, information security direction is concerned with reducing information system-related take a chance to a level acceptable to the organization. Legislation addressing federal information resources management consistently directs government agencies to follow risk-based decision-making practices when investing in, operating, and securing their data systems, obligating agencies to found hazard management as part of their IT governance [3]. Effective information resources direction requires agreement and awareness of types of hazard from a diverseness of sources. Although initial NIST guidance on risk management published prior to FISMA'south enactment emphasized addressing risk at the private information system level [4], the NIST Risk Management Framework and guidance on managing risk in Special Publication 800-39 now position information security run a risk as an integral component of enterprise run a risk direction expert at system, mission and business, and information organization tiers, every bit illustrated in Figure xiii.one.

Effigy 13.i. Information Security Risk Management Must Occur At and Between All Levels of the Organization to Enable Pervasive Gamble Sensation and to Help Ensure Consistent Risk-Based Determination Making Throughout the System [6]

Despite the best-selling importance of enterprise run a risk management, NIST explicitly limits the intended use of Special Publication 800-39 to "the management of information security-related risk derived from or associated with the performance and use of information systems or the environments in which those systems operate" [5]. System owners and agency take chances managers should not use this narrow telescopic to treat information security chance in isolation from other types of risk. Depending on the circumstances faced past an organization, the sources of information security risk may impact other enterprise risk areas, potentially including mission, financial, performance, legal, political, and reputation forms of risk. For instance, a government agency victimized by a cyber attack may endure monetary losses from allocating resources necessary to reply to the incident and may too experience reduced mission delivery adequacy that results in a loss of public confidence. Enterprise run a risk management practices need to comprise information security take a chance to develop a complete film of the risk environment for the organisation. Similarly, organizational perspectives on enterprise risk—especially including determinations of gamble tolerance—may drive or constrain system-specific decisions about functionality, security control implementation, continuous monitoring, and initial and ongoing system authorization.

Information security risk management may look somewhat different from organization to organization, even among organizations like federal government agencies that often follow the same risk management guidance. The historical pattern of inconsistent risk management practices among and even within agencies led NIST to reframe much of its data security management guidance in the context of risk direction as defined in Special Publication 800-39, a new certificate published in 2011 that offers an organizational perspective on managing risk associated with the performance and use of information systems [vii]. Special Publication 800-39 defines and describes at a high level an overarching iv-phase process for information security hazard management, depicted in Figure 13.2, and directs those implementing the process to additional publications for more than detailed guidance on risk assessment [viii] and risk monitoring [9]. In its guidance, NIST reiterates the essential role of data technology to enable the successful achievement of mission outcomes and ascribes similar importance to recognizing and managing information security risk as a prerequisite to attaining organizational goals and objectives. NIST envisions agency risk management programs characterized by [10]:

Effigy thirteen.2. NIST Defines an Integrated, Iterative Four-Pace Risk Direction Process That Establishes Organizational, Mission and Concern, and Information System-Level Roles and Responsibilities, Activities, and Communication Flows [11]

•

Senior leaders that recognize the importance of managing information security gamble and plant appropriate governance structures for managing such risk.

•

Constructive execution of risk management processes across organisation, mission and business concern, and information systems tiers.

•

An organizational climate where information security chance is considered within the context of mission and business process design, enterprise architecture definition, and system development life cycle processes.

•

Better agreement among individuals with responsibilities for data arrangement implementation or operation of how information security risk associated with their systems translates into organization-wide risk that may ultimately impact mission success.

Managing information security risk at an organizational level represents a potential change in governance practices for federal agencies and demands an executive-level commitment both to assign run a risk direction responsibilities to senior leaders and to hold those leaders accountable for their gamble management decisions and for implementing organizational run a risk management programs. The organizational perspective besides requires sufficient understanding on the part of senior direction to recognize information security risks to the agency, establish organizational risk tolerance levels, and communicate information about risk and hazard tolerance throughout the organisation for use in decision making at all levels.

Key Chance Management Concepts

Federal take chances direction guidance relies on a core gear up of concepts and definitions that all organizational personnel involved in adventure management should sympathize. Chance management is a subjective process, and many of the elements used in adventure conclusion activities are susceptible to different interpretations. NIST provided explicit examples, taxonomies, constructs, and scales in its latest guidance on conducting take chances assessments [12] that may encourage more consistent awarding of cadre take a chance management concepts, but ultimately each organization is responsible for establishing and clearly communicating whatever arrangement-wide definitions or usage expectations. To the extent that organizational risk managers tin standardize and enforce common definitions and risk rating levels, the organization may be able to facilitate the necessary step of prioritizing take a chance beyond the organization that stems from multiple sources and systems. NIST guidance adopts definitions of threat, vulnerability, and adventure from the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) National Information Balls Glossary [xiii], and uses tailored connotations of the terms likelihood and impact applied to adventure management in general and risk assessment in particular [14].

Threats

A threat is "any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations (including mission, functions, epitome, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information organization via unauthorized admission, devastation, disclosure, modification of information, and/or deprival of service." NIST guidance distinguishes between threat sources—causal agents with the adequacy to exploit a vulnerability to crusade harm—and threat events: situations or circumstances with adverse impact caused by threat sources [xv]. Risk managers need to consider a wide variety of threat sources and potentially relevant threat events, drawing upon organizational knowledge and characteristics of information systems and their operating environments as well as external sources of threat information. In its revised typhoon of Special Publication 800-30, NIST categorizes threat sources into four primary categories—adversarial, accidental, structural, and environmental—and provides an all-encompassing (though not comprehensive) list of over 70 threat events [16].

Vulnerabilities

A vulnerability is a "weakness in an information organisation, arrangement security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited past a threat source." Information system vulnerabilities ofttimes stem from missing or incorrectly configured security controls (as described in item in Capacity 8 and 11 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter eleven in the context of the security control assessment procedure) and also tin arise in organizational governance structures, business processes, enterprise compages, data security compages, facilities, equipment, system development life bicycle processes, supply chain activities, and relationships with external service providers [17]. Identifying, evaluating, and remediating vulnerabilities are cadre elements of several information security processes supporting adventure management, including security control selection, implementation, and assessment as well as continuous monitoring. Vulnerability awareness is of import at all levels of the organization, particularly when considering vulnerabilities due to predisposing conditions—such every bit geographic location—that increase the likelihood or severity of adverse events but cannot easily exist addressed at the information organisation level. Special Publication 800-39 highlights differences in risk management activities related to vulnerabilities at organization, mission and business, and information system levels, summarized in the 3-Tiered Approach section later in this chapter.

Likelihood

Likelihood in a hazard management context is an approximate of the adventure that an event will occur resulting in an adverse impact to the organization. Quantitative risk analysis sometimes uses formal statistical methods, patterns of historical observations, or predictive models to measure the probability of occurrence for a given event and determine its likelihood. In qualitative or semi-quantitative risk analysis approaches such as the method prescribed in Special Publication 800-thirty, likelihood determinations focus less on statistical probability and more oft reflect relative characterizations of factors such as a threat source'south intent and capability and the visibility or attractiveness of the system as a target [vi]. For emergent vulnerabilities, security personnel may consider factors such every bit the public availability of code, scripts, or other exploit methods or the susceptibility of systems to remote exploit attempts to help decide the range of potential threat agents that might endeavor to capitalize on a vulnerability and to better estimate the likelihood that such attempts could occur. Chance assessors utilize these factors, in combination with past feel, anecdotal evidence, and adept judgment when bachelor, to assign likelihood scores that allow comparison among multiple threats and agin impacts and—if organizations implement consistent scoring methods—support meaningful comparisons beyond different information systems, business processes, and mission functions.

Impact

Affect is a measure of the magnitude of impairment that could event from the occurrence of an adverse issue. While positive or negative impacts are theoretically possible, fifty-fifty from a single event, risk direction tends to focus only on agin impacts, driven in function by federal standards on categorizing information systems according to risk levels divers in terms of agin impact. FIPS 199 distinguishes among depression, moderate, and high potential impacts corresponding to "limited," "serious," and "astringent or catastrophic" adverse effects, respectively [18]. Current NIST guidance on gamble assessments expands the qualitative impact levels to v from 3, adding very low for "negligible" adverse effects and very high for "multiple severe or catastrophic" adverse furnishings. This guidance also proposes a similar five-level rating scale for the range or scope of agin furnishings due to threat events, and provides examples of adverse impacts in v categories based on the subject harmed: operations, assets, individuals, other organizations, and the nation [19]. Bear on ratings significantly influence overall risk level determinations and can—depending on internal and external policies, regulatory mandates, and other drivers—produce specific security requirements that agencies and system owners must satisfy through the effective implementation of security controls.

Alarm

The use of standardized rating scales for the severity of threats and vulnerabilities, likelihood of occurrence, impact levels, and risk offers enormous value to organizations seeking consistent application of risk management practices, merely the subjective nature of the definitions respective to numeric rating scores can produce a false sense of consistency. Take a chance executives operating at the arrangement tier need to establish clear rating guidelines and organization-specific interpretations of relative terms such equally "limited" and "severe" to help ensure that the ratings are applied in the same style beyond the organization.

Take chances

Risk is "a measure out of the extent to which an entity is threatened past a potential circumstance or event" typically represented as a function of adverse impact due to an consequence and the likelihood of the event occurring. Risk in a general sense comprises many different sources and types that organizations address through enterprise risk management [xx]. FISMA and associated NIST guidance focus on information security risk, with item emphasis on information organisation-related risks arising from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data or data systems. The range of potential adverse impacts to organizations from information security risk include those affecting operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the nation. Organizations limited risk in unlike means and with dissimilar scope depending on which level of the organization is involved—information organisation owners typically identify and charge per unit chance from multiple threat sources applicable to their systems, while mission and concern and organizational characterizations of risk may seek to rank or prioritize different hazard ratings across the organization or amass multiple risk ratings to provide an enterprise gamble perspective. Risk is the primary input to organizational hazard management, providing the basic unit of analysis for take a chance assessment and monitoring and the cadre data used to make up one's mind advisable risk responses and any needed strategic or tactical adjustments to risk management strategy [21].

Read full affiliate

URL:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9781597496414000138

Security Risk Direction

Kevin East. Peterson , in The Professional Protection Officer, 2010

Two Key Elements: Assessment and Mitigation

The exercise of security take chances management (SRM) begins with a thorough and well-thought-out risk assessment. Why? Considering we cannot brainstorm to answer questions until we know what the questions are—or solve problems until we know what the bug are. A good assessment process naturally leads direct into a risk mitigation strategy. These two primal elements will be discussed further in this chapter and are mentioned at various points throughout this book with respect to specific protection applications.

Note: The following cloth is extracted from "Primer on Security Risk Management" and is used with permission.

Whether in the public or individual sector, and whether dealing with traditional or cyber security (or both), asset protection practice is increasingly based on the principle of risk management. The concept is a perfect fit for the field of asset protection, since our chief objective is to manage risks by balancing the cost of protection measures with their benefit.

Read full chapter

URL:

https://world wide web.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9781856177467000274

Cybersecurity framework

Leighton Johnson , in Security Controls Evaluation, Testing, and Assessment Handbook (Second Edition), 2020

Tier i: Partial

•

Risk Management Process —Organizational security hazard management practices are not formalized, and risk is managed in an ad hoc and sometimes reactive manner. Prioritization of security activities may not be directly informed by organizational risk objectives, the threat environment, or business/mission requirements.

•

Integrated Risk Direction Plan—At that place is limited awareness of security take a chance at the organizational level and an organization-wide approach to managing security hazard has not been established. The organisation implements security risk management on an irregular, case-past-example ground due to varied experience or data gained from outside sources. The organization may non have processes that enable security information to be shared inside the organization.

•

External Participation—An organization may non take the processes in identify to participate in coordination or collaboration with other entities.

Read full chapter

URL:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128184271000124

Resilience, Chance Management, Business Continuity, and Emergency Management

Philip P. Purpura , in Security and Loss Prevention (Sixth Edition), 2013

Enterprise Risk Management and Enterprise Security Chance Management

A trend today in the risk management field is enterprise risk management (ERM). Leimberg et al. (2002: vi) define information technology as "a management procedure that identifies, defines, quantifies, compares, prioritizes, and treats all of the textile risks facing an organization, whether or not it is insurable." ERM takes risk management to the next level. It refers to a comprehensive risk direction program that addresses a diverseness of business risks. Examples are take a chance of turn a profit or loss; uncertainty regarding the arrangement's goals as information technology faces its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats; and risk of blow, fire, crime, and disasters. When all of these risks are packaged into 1 plan, planning is improved and overall hazard can exist reduced. Because risks ofttimes are uncorrelated (i.e., all of them causing loss in the same year), insurance costs are lower. For instance, a company is unlikely to face up the post-obit losses in the same year: fire, adverse motility in a strange currency, and homicide in the workplace (Rejda, 2001: 64–66).

Leimberg et al. (2002: vi) draw the trend of two separate and distinct forms of risk management. Issue risk management focuses on traditional risks (e.k., burn) that insurance covers. Financial risk management protects the financial avails of a business from risks that insurers generally avert. Examples are foreign currency commutation chance, credit risk, and interest rate movements. Various capital take a chance transfer tools are available to protect financial assets. ERM seeks to combine event and fiscal hazard for a comprehensive approach to business organization risks.

Mehta (2010) differs from Leimberg by arguing for a more than holistic approach to risks by including intangible assets (eastward.g., brand and client relationships) that are typically not protected by traditional risk management. He notes that ERM is non always nigh reducing risks; it can address over-managing risk or not taking enough risk and exploiting business opportunities. Mehta writes that although much has been written almost ERM, non all organizations have embraced the concept and some prefer the term "risk direction" because adding "enterprise" creates a distraction nigh its meaning while managing risk is the of import goal.

Some other term with the give-and-take "enterprise" fastened is enterprise security risk management (ESRM). Harbinger (2010: 58) writes that ERM includes ESRM, and like to ERM, ESRM is holistic in its approach. He espouses the importance of interdependencies. For example, the risks resulting from a labor dispute disrupting supply chains and how all the units of a visitor piece of work together to address all risks.

ASIS International (2010a: 4) enquiry showed that acme security leaders from major organizations are "deeply involved with evaluating and mitigating nonsecurity risks in their organizations." Summit nonsecurity risks included the economic system, competition, regulatory pressure, and failure of Information technology systems. Skill sets required to succeed at ESRM focused on business direction, leadership, and communication skills.

As explained in Chapter eighteen, ESRM also includes human resources protection (HRP). This is a broad concept that protects all employees and those linked to them (e.thou., family and customers). Depending on organizational requirements, HRP can include workplace violence prevention, executive protection, safety, wellness, use of technology and social media, and personal and family protection. HRP is vital because people are the most valued nugget to an organisation and, depending on the type of impairment to them, the consequences can be devastating.

Should a security and loss prevention executive or a CSO in a company be part of a company enterprise hazard management committee? Why or why not?

International Perspective: Risk Management in a Multinational Business

Morris (2001: 22–30) writes about overseas business operations, risks, and the demand for answers to specific questions about each country in which business will be conducted. She begins with the following questions: How is business organization conducted in comparison to the The states? How strong is the currency? How vulnerable is the area to natural disasters, fire, and crime? What are the potential employment practices liability problems? What is the record of accomplishment of shipments to and from the area?

Political risks are specially challenging in overseas operations. Are terrorist groups or the regime hostile to strange companies and their employees? Does the host government have a tape of instability and war, seizing foreign assets, capping increases in the price of products or adding taxes to undermine strange investments, and imposing barriers to control the movement of capital out of the country?

80 percentage of the terrorist acts committed against U.Due south. interests abroad target U.Due south. businesses, rather than governmental or military posts. These threats include kidnapping, extortion, product contamination, workplace violence, and Information technology demolition.

The concept of enterprise risk management can exist specially helpful with multinational businesses considering of a multitude of threats and hazards. A key challenge for the risk director is to join a total range of resources and network in the United states and overseas prior to potential losses so, if a loss occurs, a speedy and aggressive response helps the business to rebound.

Options for insurance include buying it in the home country and arranging coverage for overseas operations; however, this may be illegal in some countries that require admitted insurance. Another approach is to permit the business firm'due south direction in each country brand the insurance decision, merely this means that the corporate headquarters has less command of chance management. A third artery is to piece of work with a global insurer who has subsidiaries or partner insurers in each country; this approach offers uniform coverage globally. A key question in these approaches is: Is the insurer financially solvent to pay the insured following a covered loss?

Read full chapter

URL:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780123878465000127

Risk Management

Sokratis 1000. Katsikas , in Computer and Data Security Handbook (Third Edition), 2013

Context Establishment

The context institution process receives as input all relevant information about the system. Establishing the context for information security gamble management determines the purpose of the process. It involves setting bones criteria to be used in the process, defining the scope and boundaries of the process, and establishing an appropriate organization operating the process. The output of the context establishment process is the specification of these parameters.

The purpose may exist to back up an information security management organisation (ISMS); to comply with legal requirements and provide testify of due diligence; to prepare for a business continuity plan; to gear up for an incident reporting plan; or to describe the information security requirements for a product, service, or mechanism. Combinations of these purposes are too possible.

Bones criteria include risk evaluation, touch, and chance acceptance. When setting take chances evaluation criteria, the arrangement should consider the strategic value of the concern information procedure; the criticality of the data assets involved; legal and regulatory requirements and contractual obligations; operational and business importance of the attributes of information security; and stakeholders' expectations and perceptions, and negative consequences for goodwill and reputation. Impact criteria specify the degree of damage or costs to the arrangement caused by an data security outcome. Developing impact criteria involves considering the level of nomenclature of the impacted information asset; breaches of data security; dumb operations; loss of business and financial value; disruption of plans and deadlines; damage to reputation; and breach of legal, regulatory, or contractual requirements. Risk acceptance criteria depend on the organisation's policies, goals, and objectives, and the interest of its stakeholders. When developing risk acceptance criteria, the system should consider business criteria, legal and regulatory aspects, operations, technology, finance, and social and humanitarian factors.

The telescopic of the procedure needs to be divers to ensure that all relevant assets are taken into account in the subsequent risk cess. Whatever exclusion from the scope needs to be justified. In add-on, the boundaries need to be identified to address risks that might ascend through these boundaries. When defining the scope and boundaries, the organization needs to consider its strategic business organization objectives, strategies, and policies; its business organisation processes; its functions and structure; applicative legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements; its data security policy; its overall approach to adventure direction; its information assets; its locations and their geographical characteristics; constraints that impact it; expectations of its stakeholders; its sociocultural surround; and its information exchange with its surround. This involves studying the organization (its master purpose, its business concern; its mission; its values; its construction; its organizational chart; and its strategy). Information technology also involves identifying its constraints. These may be of a political, cultural, or strategic nature; they may be territorial, organizational, structural, functional, personnel, budgetary, technical, or ecology constraints; or they could exist constraints arising from preexisting processes. Finally, it entails identifying legislation, regulations, and contracts.

Setting up and maintaining the arrangement for information security risk management fulfills function of the requirement to determine and provide the resources needed to institute, implement, operate, monitor, review, maintain, and meliorate an ISMS. 13 The organization to be developed will bear responsibility for developing the information security chance management process suitable for the organization; for identifying and analyzing the stakeholders; for defining roles and responsibilities of all parties, both external and internal to the arrangement; for establishing the required relationships between the organization and stakeholders, interfaces to the arrangement's high-level take chances direction functions, as well as interfaces to other relevant projects or activities; for defining determination escalation paths; and for specifying records to be kept. Key roles in this organization are the senior management, the master data officer, the organization and information owners, the business and functional managers, the information systems security officers, the IT security practitioners, and the security sensation trainers (security/subject field thing professionals). Additional roles that can be explicitly defined are those of the risk assessor and of the security risk manager.

Read total chapter

URL:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978012803843700034X

What Are We Trying to Prevent?

Eric Knipp , ... Edgar Danielyan Technical Editor , in Managing Cisco Network Security (2d Edition), 2002

Developing a Security Policy

Developing a security policy is the single about of import stride in security hazard management. Security policy is the gum that binds the various efforts together. It provides the statement of goals and intent that the security infrastructure is designed to enforce. In many respects, it is better to accept a policy and no firewall rather than firewall and no policy. With policy, you can know what information technology is you lot need to do, and take the necessary steps to ensure your goals are achieved. Without policy, whatsoever control you deploy will be hit or miss, and there is no guarantee you will reach your purpose. Because the fundamental issues of security come from control of the details, your overall security is probably weakened.

All sites have some policy, of course. If zip is written down, then the policy exists in the consensual cultural expectation. People probably have some expectations: That their PC will turn on in the morn, that they can access their email without information technology being distributed to competitors, that the file they were working on yesterday will still be in that location and incorporate the same information when they airtight the application. Sometimes policy can exist inferred: For example, many sites adopt an "capricious network traffic tin become out; merely a specified set of traffic—mail to the mail server, Spider web clients to the public Web server tin go in equally a default information catamenia-control policy. Most people empathise and accept the principle of least permission, and these are probably in the breezy policy.

Documentation is important, however. People need guidance on how to handle the information, services, and equipment around them. Is it acceptable to load games on the office PC? Allowing uncontrolled applications runs the run a risk of a potential loss of system integrity. Many sites discourage such behavior, simply and so allow it on field worker laptops equally an adequate compromise when it comes to security, utility, and morale. Is it acceptable to receive personal e-mail on your corporate account? Allowing such things runs the risk of increased network utilization, and the transport of Trojans into the corporate network, only at the same time encourages increased literacy and raises morale. Policy needs to be written downward so consensual policy tin can be made clear to all members of the community. Likewise, managers ideally need to brand trade-offs to ensure due protection of corporate avails while optimizing worker efficiency.

Policy does not demand to be overly circuitous. Indeed, information technology'due south best to make policy brusque. A policy framework can institute the overall guidelines—to borrow a Judeo-Christian metaphor: The Ten Commandments of security might be better than the security Bible. Most people only need those X Commandments. Where necessary, there can be a security Bible, which provides more detailed guidance, and provides documentation on security control configuration or security architecture strategies, but policy, at its best, should be holistically integrated into the people, processes, and engineering science that provides secure concern information flow.

Read full affiliate

URL:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9781931836562500064

Information Engineering science Risk Measurements and Metrics

Carl Southward. Young , in Data Security Scientific discipline, 2016

Persistence of Chance Applied to the NIST Framework

The Persistence of Gamble measurement is indicative of the quality and consistency of security risk management processes. In add-on to trending, persistence reveals temporal information that can be used to measure out the NIST Identify and/or Protect Functions and therefore exist used to specify a NIST Tier rating.

For example, the proliferation of dried accounts and/or hosts with loftier CVSS ratings would argue that information security hazard management processes were less than repeatable. Therefore, the Identify and/or Protect NIST Functions would be rated accordingly. Again, the specific criteria used to justify a NIST Tier rating such as the magnitude of the Persistence of Gamble measurement must exist adamant for each system.

Read total chapter

URL:

https://world wide web.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128096437000127

Success Factors

Stephen D. Gantz , Daniel R. Philpott , in FISMA and the Risk Management Framework, 2013

Summary

This affiliate describes and explains the importance of several organizational factors that influence the success of information security gamble direction at both organizational and private information system levels. Specifically, it highlighted the essential part of senior leadership back up, the organizational information security program, effective planning and resource allotment, and functioning measurement and management in establishing and maintaining compliance with security laws, regulations, and policies; consistently executing the Risk Management Framework for agency information systems, and enabling the achievement of mission objectives and programme outcomes. Collectively, these success factors profoundly heighten the ability of an system to manage information security risk and to demonstrate the value and otherwise justify investment in information security programs and associated activities.

Read full chapter

URL:

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/commodity/pii/B9781597496414000059